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Abstract 
The statutory derivative actions were introduced over ten years ago into China under the 
Chinese Company Law 2005 and into the United Kingdom under the Companies Act 2006. 
This paper conducts a comparative and empirical analysis of the development and 
effectiveness of statutory derivative actions in China and the UK. It also evaluates the rules 
on derivative actions in the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues 
concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China IV, which 
became effective on 1
st
 September 2017.  
 
Introduction  
 
Derivative actions allow shareholders to bring an action against wrongdoing directors on 
behalf of the company. They play an important role in building a better regime for corporate 
governance, in particular in deterring directors from breaching their duties, holding directors 
accountable to their companies and in protecting the interests of companies and shareholders.  
Derivative actions were introduced into China for the first time in the Chinese Company Law 
2005 (the ‘CCL 2005’) 1.  In total 103 derivative action cases were filed over the eight-year 
period from 1
st
 January 2006 to 30
th
 August 2013
2
.  By contrast, almost at the same time the 
derivative claims were codified in the United Kingdom in the Companies Act 2006 (the ‘CA 
2006’)3. They replaced the complex and highly unsatisfactory procedures at common law. 
Despite the codification, the statutory derivative claims have not been frequently used since 
they came into force. A total of 22 derivative claims were instituted in the UK between 
October 2007 and September 2015
4
.   
 
                                                          
1
 The Chinese Company Law 2005 came into force on 1
st
 January 2006 and the derivative actions were stated in 
Art 152 of the CCL 2005. The current rules are stated in Art 151 in the Chinese Company Law (revised in 2013).  
2
 Shaowei Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 2015), p 123.  
3
 Sections 260-263, CA 2006. 
4
 Keay, “Assessing and Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for Derivative Actions under the Companies Act 2006” 
(2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39, 41.  
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At first glance, it appears from the number of cases that the derivative actions in China are 
more successful and more popular than those in the UK; however, on a closer look, the rules 
in China are far from perfect. This paper analyses the effectiveness of derivative actions in 
China by comparing with their counterparts in the UK; in particular, it explores the reasons 
why they are widely used in China and rarely permitted in the UK. The judicial attitudes will 
be assessed by reference to recent empirical studies of derivative action cases5. This paper 
will, by way of comparison, identify any lessons that China and the UK can learn from each 
other or any pitfalls to be avoided whilst taking into account the different socio-economic and 
legal backgrounds. 
 
The Chinese Supreme People’s Court, after over one year’s Consultation6, recently published 
the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application 
of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (the ‘SPC Provisions 2017’)7. They 
became effective on 1
st
 September 2017 and introduced detailed rules on the validity of board 
decisions and shareholder resolutions as well as shareholders’ rights and remedies. In 
particular, the SPC Provisions 2017 contain specific rules on shareholders’ right to 
information, shareholders’ right to dividends, pre-emption rights and derivative actions8. This 
paper will evaluate whether they have clarified the uncertainties of derivative actions in 
China.    
 
1.  Derivative Actions prior to the Chinese Company Law 2005 
 
Derivative actions were not established under the previous Chinese Company Law 1993 (the 
‘CCL 1993’) and only a few cases were accepted in local courts. When shareholders intended 
to initiate derivative actions, the lack of statutory rules led to the courts’ restrictive attitudes9 
                                                          
5
 Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 27 
Banking and Finance Law Review 619. Shaowei Lin, “A New Perspective on China’s Derivative Actions: Who 
is Best Suited to Assessing Derivative Actions?” (2016) ICCLR 1. Shaowei Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese 
Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 2015)  
6
 The SPC published the Consultation Paper on the SPC Provisions on the Application of Chinese Company 
Law on 12
th
 April 2016. http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/04/id/1837721.shtml  
7
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa Ruogan Wenti de Guiding 
(4).  Interpretation No. 16 [2017] of the Supreme People's Court. 
8
 Rules 23-26, SPC Provisions 2017. 
9
 In many cases, the courts were reluctant to hear derivative actions because of a lack of substantive and 
procedural rules in the CCL 1993. Such lawsuits would in all likelihood be unsuccessful; for example, in 
Chengdu Hongguang Industrial Corporation Case, the claim was rejected by the court on the basis that the 
minority shareholders were not qualified as claimants. Yang, “Comparative Corporate Governance: Reforming 
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and inconsistent judgments which in turn left the interests of companies and shareholders 
insufficiently protected
10
. Despite these obstacles, a few derivative actions cases were 
accepted by the courts and successfully litigated
11
; for example, the judgment in Xinlida12  
was based on the general principle contained in Art 1 of the CCL 1993 that “the legitimate 
rights and interests of companies and shareholders should be protected”13. In Hengtong14, it 
was held that, in accordance with the general principle of “fairness, honesty and credibility” 
in Art 4 of the General Principles of Civil Law 1986, the controlling shareholder should 
compensate the company’s losses. These innovative judgments were applauded as they 
allowed derivative actions despite the lack of legal basis.
15
 They have been followed by more 
derivative actions such as Wu Fang Zhai 16 and Zhongqi Qihuo17. The judgments, however, 
were inconsistent and it was difficult for shareholders to predict the result of the litigation in 
advance because of the lack of rules on derivative actions under the CCL 1993
18
. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Chinese Corporate Governance” (2005) 16 ICCLR 8, 17. Deng, “Building an Investor-friendly Shareholder 
Derivative Lawsuit System in China” (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 347, at 365.  Art & Gu, 
“China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China” (1995) 20 Yale J. Int’L 273, 
299. “CSEC’s Report on Serious Violation of Law by Chengdu Hongduang Corporation” [Zhongguo 
Zhengquanhui Guanyu Chengdu Hongguang Shiye Gufen Youxian Gongsi Yanzhong Weifa Weigu Anjian de 
Tongbao], Issue No 11, 1998,  available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn.  
10
 Lu Wang, “The First Case in the Stock Market – Shareholder Sues Chairman on Behalf of the 
Corporations”[Zhengquan Shichang Youchu Diyi An – Gudong Daibiao Gongsi Zhuanggao Dongshizhang], 
Shanghai Securities Daily [Shanghai Zhengquan Bao], 9 April 2003.  
11
 Junhai Liu, Institutional Innovations of New Corporate Law: Legislative and Judicial Controversies [Xin 
Gongsifa de Zhidu Chuangxin: Lifa Zhengdian yu Jieshi Nandian] (Law Press, China, 2006), p.248. 
12
 [Xiamen Yuanyiyuan Fangchan Kaifa Youxian Gongsi yu Xiamen Xinlida Youxian Gongsi, Xiamen  Xinlida 
Fangchan Kaifa Youxian Gongsi, Fujian Sheng XiamenShi Siming Qu Renmin Fayuan] available at case 
database www.lawyee.net  (in Chinese).  
13
 MinAn Zhang, “Legal Protection for Minority Shareholders’ Rights” [Xiaogudong Quanli de Falu Baohu], in 
Huixing Liang (ed.), Civil and Commercial Law Review [Minshang Fa Lucong], vol.9, Law Press [Falu 
Chuban She], 1998, at p.160, in which he argued that minority shareholders were excluded from this 
protected group in practice. 
14
 Nanchang Real Estate Ltd and Pudong Investment Management Ltd v. Xinjiangnan Industries Co. Ltd  (2000) 
Jiangsu Higher Court No 206, (2000) WuXi Court No 140. See also Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2001, No 6.  
15
 Peizhong Gan, “The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Limited Liability Companies - From the 
Perspective of Litigation” [Youxian Gongsi Xiaogudong Liyi Baohu de Faxue Sikao-Cong Susong Shijiao 
Kaocha], Studies in Law and Business (Fashang Yanjiu), No 6, 2002. 
16
 It was decided by the Intermediate People’s Court of Jiaxing City, Zhejiang Province in 2001. Xiaoping Lu, 
“The Wufangzhai Case Led to Many Legal Issues” [Wufangzhai Shijian Yinfa Zhuduo Falu Wenti], 
Shenzhen Legal Daily [Shenzhen Fazhi Bao], 30 July 2001, p.14. Yang Yang, “The Loss of RMB 2.58 
million Paid by the Chairman Personally” [RMB 2,580,000 Sunshi You Dongshizhang Geren Pei] Shanghai 
Legal Daily [Shanghai Fazhi Bao] 22 August 2001, p.5.   
17
 It was decided by the High People’s Court of Beijing in December 2005. See the comments by Wang Na, 
‘The Significance of Zhongqi Qihuo Case’[Zhongqi Qihuo An de Biaogan Yiyi] , available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2006-01/09/content_4027001.htm  9 January 2006.  
18
 Ma, “The Deficiencies of Derivative Actions in China” (2010) 5 Company Lawyer 149, pp 150-152. 
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introduction of specific rules on derivative actions was highly desirable for the protection of 
shareholders’ interests19.  
 
Prior to the CCL 2005, a total of 23 derivative action cases were decided in China
 20
, out of 
which 4 cases were refused on the ground that the claimant shareholders were not eligible to 
bring an action against the wrongdoers on behalf of the company; 16 cases were accepted and 
2 cases were settled
21
. Almost all of the cases concerned limited liability companies (the 
‘LLC’)22  and only one case was related to listed company23. It appears that the courts took a 
more conservative attitude towards derivative actions involving listed companies due to the 
complexity of the cases and their impact on the public.
24
 As will be discussed below, this 
trend has continued after the introduction of derivative actions in the CCL 2005. 
 
2. Derivative Actions under the Chinese Company Law 2005  
 
The derivative actions are contained in Art 151 of the CCL 2005 (revised in 2013). The locus 
standi requirements of the claimant and the scope of defendants are discussed as well as the 
role of the company in a derivative claim.  
a. The  Locus standi  requirements 
 
The locus standi requirements concern the essential scope of derivative actions and play an 
important part in preventing unmeritorious suits. Different requirements apply to joint stock 
companies (the ‘JSCs’) and LLCs. JSC shareholders must hold separately or aggregately no 
less than 1% of the company’s shares for at least 180 days.25 These requirements are not 
imposed on LLC shareholders; thus, any shareholder is qualified as a claimant in a derivative 
action. The less restrictive approach reflects the sympathies for LLC shareholders due to their 
                                                          
19
 Guanhua Yu, “Towards an Institutional Competition Model of Comparative Corporate Governance Studies” 
(2003) 6 J.Chinese & Comp.L (H.K).31, 56.  
20
 Shaowei Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 2015), p 101. 
21
 The remaining one case was not published at the time of the research. The publication of court judgments is 
not compulsory in China and therefore not all judgments were available on the database. 
22
 Shaowei Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 2015), p 101. 
23
 Lu Wang, “The First Derivative Action Was Not Accepted” [Shouli Gudong Daibiao Susong Wei Shouli], 
Shanghai Securities Daily [Shanghai Zhengquan Bao], 22 April  2003. In the case of Sanjiu Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd (2003), Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court rejected the case and ruled that the 
claimant shareholder must obtain authorization from all the shareholders of Sanjiu before bringing the lawsuit to 
the court because a derivative action should be brought in the interests of all shareholders. 
24
 Xiaoning Li, A Comparative Study of Shareholders’ Derivative Actions: England, the United States, Germany 
and China (Kluwer: Deventer, 2007), p. 271.  
25
 Art 151(1), CCL 2005.  
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difficulties in transferring their shares and leaving the companies;
26
 however, an easy access 
to judicial remedies is often accompanied by the risk of increased litigation and potentially a 
rise in the number of malicious suits.   
 
The requirements imposed on JSC shareholders are criticised as being too restrictive. In listed 
companies with a highly concentrated shareholding ownership, hardly any individual 
shareholder, apart from the top three shareholders, can meet the 1% requirement.
27
 Even in 
listed companies where the shares are widely dispersed, it is unrealistic to bring minority 
shareholders together because of the expense and time involved as well as their varied and 
often conflicting views. It is argued that the percentage requirement should be lowered or 
preferably totally abolished so that any current shareholder would be entitled to initiate a 
derivative action which is the case in UK.   
 
In addition to the shareholding percentage requirement, the claimant shareholders of JSCs 
must hold the shares for at least 180 days until the day when the litigation is initiated
28
. As 
many individual shareholders, in particular those of listed companies, purchase shares for 
short-term investment, the average shareholding period is relatively shorter compared to 180 
days.  According to Jin Xin’s study, the average shareholding period on the securities market 
in China was less than four months (about 120 days);
29
 thus, the 180 days requirement may 
be a real obstacle for individual minority shareholders in listed companies. This hurdle may 
be one of the main reasons that very few cases were brought by shareholders in listed 
companies in China. It is therefore argued that the shareholding period be shortened or 
abolished in order to protect the interests of shareholders in JSCs.  
 
                                                          
26
 Zhiyong Zhang, “The Rules on Derivative Actions in the Company Law Reform Proposal Draft 2005” [Dui 
Woguo Gonsifa Xiuding Caoan Paisheng Susong Tiaojian de Sikao] (2005) 5 Chinese Lawyer [Zhongguo 
Lushi] 52, 52.  
27
 Jinzhu Yang, “The role of shareholders in enforcing director’s duties: A comparative study of the United 
Kingdom and China (Part 2)” (2006) 17 I.C.C.L.R. 381, 390. According to the survey of the ownership 
structure of listed companies in China conducted by Yang, on average, the proportion of shares held by the 
largest shareholder is in excess of 45%, the second largest is about 5%, the third is about 3%, and afterwards, 
no individual shareholder held more than 1% of company’s issued shares.  
28
 In 2006, the Supreme People’s Court promulgated the judicial interpretation entitled “Regulations on the 
Application of Company Law of the People’s Republic of China” [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa Ruogan Guiding Yijian 2006].  
29
 Jin Xin, Shareholding Structure and Corporate Governance in Listed Companies [Shangshi Gongsi Guqian 
Jiegou yu Gonsi Zhili], China Finance Press [Zhongguo Jinrong Chubanshe], 2005, pp 143-144.  
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Recent research has shown that derivative actions in China have been used more widely in 
LLCs than JSCs. Huang conducted an empirical study
30
  on the derivative actions from 1
st
 
January 2006 to 30
th
 December 2010. The research located 50 reported cases during the five-
year period
31
 since the introduction of the derivative action in China. The study shows that all 
reported derivative action cases involved LLCs
32
 whilst no action was brought in relation to 
JSCs
33
. This finding is echoed by Lin’s study of derivative action cases from 1st January 2006 
to 30
th
 August 2013, which concludes that there are “almost no cases”  involving derivative 
actions in JSCs, listed or unlisted
34
.  
 
This trend could be explained by taking into account the strict locus standi requirements for 
JSC shareholders, who must hold separately or aggregately no less than 1% of the company’s 
share capital for at least 180 days. By contrast, these requirements do not apply to LLC 
shareholders and as such there are fewer barriers for LLC shareholders in pursuing derivative 
actions compared to JSC shareholders. Moreover, it may be difficult for LLCs shareholders 
to sell their shares and exit the companies because there are usually restrictions on the 
transfer of shares and they cannot be traded on the stock markets. By contrast, shareholders in 
JSCs particularly listed companies may find it relatively easy to exit the companies. LLCs 
shareholders therefore have more incentives to redress corporate wrongs and recover their 
losses. The courts may also take a more restrictive approach towards JSCs and in particular 
state-owned enterprises because of concerns that the management of companies may suffer 
undue interference from shareholders’ malicious lawsuits.  
 
The requirements on locus standi in China are stricter than those in the UK where any current 
shareholder of a company can bring a derivative claim. Neither the shareholding percentage 
                                                          
30
 Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 
27 Banking and Finance Law Review 619, 627.  
31
 The number of cases per year is listed below: 12 cases in 2006, 11 in 2007, 16 in 2008 and 11 in 2009. Huang 
argued that the number of cases has stayed relatively constant over the 5 years. No case was recorded in 2010 
when the study was carried out mainly because the cases filed in 2010 were still open or just decided and not 
collected yet in the database.  
32
 Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 
27 Banking and Finance Law Review 619, 635. In almost half of all cases (24 out of 50 cases), derivative suits 
were brought as a means to resolve dispute between two shareholders.  In particular, the claimant has a large 
shareholding in the company; in 66 percent of all cases (33 out of 50), the claimant held 10 percent or more of 
shares in the company; in 46 per cent of all cases (23 out of 50), the claimant had more than one third 
shareholding. The claimant had less than 10% shareholding in just two cases.  
33
 Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 
27 Banking and Finance Law Review 619, 631. 
34
 Sanlian Shangshe case is the only one case involving a JSC (and a listed company) after the implementation 
of the CCL 2005. 
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nor the time period is required.
 35
  Although the strict requirements in China aim to prevent 
frivolous suits, it may prevent JSC shareholders from bringing derivative actions and 
redressing corporate wrongs. The less restrictive approach in the UK does not necessarily 
encourage unmeritorious suits because of the strict procedures whereby the claimants have to 
seek permission from the courts to continue the claims.  As a corollary, the courts in China 
should be given greater discretion in such cases in order to prevent malicious suits; however, 
this requires a competent and experienced judiciary to adopt a well-designed procedure to 
filter out the malicious suits.   
 
b. The role of the company  
 
The SPC Provisions 2017 have clarified the role of the company in a derivative action, which 
was not specified under the CCL 2005. According to Rule 24 (1), the company should be 
treated as a third person in a derivative action. Rule 24 (2) states that if other shareholders of 
the company, who meet the requirements in Art 151(1) of CCL 2005, wish to bring the same 
claim and join the litigation before the close of court debate in the first instance, they should 
be listed as co-claimants. These rules have filled a gap in the CCL 2005 by providing clearer 
guidance for the courts in the trial of such cases.   
 
C.   The scope of defendants  
 
The scope of defendants directly affects the functions of derivative actions as a deterrent 
against corporate wrongs. Under the CCL 2005, a shareholder can bring a derivative action 
against any director, supervisor or senior manager36 who has violated laws, administrative 
regulations or the company’s articles of association in the course of performing their duties 
for the company and thereby caused damage to the company.
37
 A derivative action can also 
be brought against any other person who has infringed the company’s interests and caused 
damage to the company.
38
   
                                                          
35
 S 261, CA 2006. 
36
 The senior manager is defined as “a manager, deputy manager, any person in charge of a company’s finance, 
the secretary of the board of directors of a listed company as well as any other person as stated in the articles 
of association”. Art 217, CCL 2005.  
37
 Art 150, CCL 2005. 
38
 Art 151(3), CCL 2005 states that “Where another person infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a 
company and thus causes losses to the company, the shareholders specified in the first paragraph of this Article 
may bring a lawsuit to a people’s court in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs.” 
8 
 
 
In the light of the misconduct of the majority shareholders which took place on a wide scale 
in China, majority shareholders are subject to derivative actions in the CCL 2005
39
; however, 
the definition or scope of “any other person” is unclear.  Gan proposed that “any other person” 
should include outsiders such as the company’s creditors or administrative bodies who have 
infringed the company’s interests.40  Cai, however, argued for a more restrictive view fearing 
an increase in the number of lawsuits. He suggested that “any other person” should be limited 
to insiders of the company such as the majority shareholders, liquidators and auditors.
41
 
Recent studies show that a broad interpretation of “any other person” has been adopted by the 
courts.  
 
According to Huang’s study42, directors (including senior managers) are the most common 
defendants (almost half of all defendants), followed by “other people” and supervisors. 
“Other people” mainly include controlling shareholders or actual controllers who do not hold 
any office in the company, contractual counterparties of the company, and competing 
companies which were set up by directors of the company
43
. In terms of the cause of action, 
the most common type of complaints is the breach of duty of loyalty, in particular, self-
dealing or related transactions, setting up a new competing company and misappropriating 
corporate assets. A small number of cases are related to the breach of duty of care
44
. 
 
Similar findings were made in Lin’s research of 103 cases from January 2006 to August 
2013
45
. The defendants are directors or senior managers in 72 cases, which is nearly 70 per 
cent of all the cases. The defendants are “other people” in 51 cases. In 26 cases the 
defendants are shareholders only (which means that they are neither directors nor senior 
managers). In only 4 cases the defendants are supervisors.  This study shows that many 
defendants fall into the category of “other persons” and Art 151 has extended the scope of 
                                                          
39
 CCL 2005, Art 21 states that controlling shareholders will be responsible for the company’s losses if they take 
advantage of their affiliated relationships and cause damages to the company.    
40
 Peizhong Gan, “Lessons for Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law” [Jianping Zhongguo Gongsifa dui 
Gudong Paisheng Susong Zhidu de Jiejian], in Xudong Zhao(ed.), Company Law Review [Gongsifa Pinglun]  
(People’s Court Press, 2005, No 1), p.27. 
41
 Lidong Cai, “The Scope of Respondents in the Shareholder Derivative Actions” [Lun Gudong Paisheng 
Susong zhong Beigao de Fanwei] (2007) 21 Contemporary Law Review (Dangdai Faxue)  153, 158.  
42
 Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 
27 Banking and Finance Law Review 619, 635. 
43
 ibid, 636. 
44
 ibid, 637. 
45
 Shaowei Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 2015), pp 126-127.  
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defendants to third parties. This is a very welcome step forward because such a broad 
interpretation will ultimately help to protect the interests of companies.  
 
The SPC Consultation Paper 2016 suggests that “other people” refer to people who are not 
directors, supervisors or senior managers in the company or its wholly-owned subsidiary
46
. It 
also states that the directors, senior managers, board of supervisors, or supervisors in Art 
151(1) and Art 151(2) include those in the company’s wholly-owned subsidiary. 
Unfortunately, these definitions were not adopted in the SPC Provisions 2017 and as such the 
scope of “other people” remains unclear.  
 
3.  The demand rule in China   
 
In China, it is recognized that derivative actions are unusual forms of litigation which bypass 
the majority rule and the separate corporate personality principle.
47
  If used improperly, the 
interests of the company and other shareholders will be at risk. It is essential therefore to 
strike a proper balance between a company’s autonomy and judicial interference, and 
between the protection of minority shareholders and the prevention of malicious lawsuits. It 
is crucial to place some procedural hurdles in the path of derivative actions.  
 
Before derivative claims are filed, shareholders must make a written demand to either the 
board of directors or the board of supervisors
48
. If directors or senior managers breach their 
duties, a demand should be made to the board of supervisors. If supervisors breach their 
duties, a demand should be made to the board of directors or to an executive director of a 
LLC which does not have a board of directors. This cross-demand aims to avoid a conflict of 
interests when the board makes the decision regarding litigation. If the board of directors or 
supervisors refuses to initiate the litigation, or fails to bring a lawsuit within 30 days of 
receipt of the request, a shareholder is entitled to bring a derivative action.
49
   This demand 
rule aims to make full use of all the internal remedies of a company and to save time and 
expense of litigation if the board decides to ratify the misconduct or to sue the wrongdoer.  
                                                          
46
 SPC Consultation Paper 2016, Art 31(2). 
47
 Baoshu Wang, “The Concept of Commercial Law and the Conceptual Commercial Law” [Shangshifa de 
Linian yu Linian shang de Shangshi Fa], in Baoshu Wang (ed.) Commercial Law [Shangshi Fa Lunji]  (Law 
Press, 1997), p.7.  
48
 Art 151, CCL 2005. 
49
 ibid. 
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The question is whether this rule has achieved its aims without making the procedure unduly 
complex for shareholders.  
 
Although the legislators intended to avoid conflict of interests by imposing the cross-demand 
rule, the lack of independence on the part of a board of supervisors may cast doubt on 
whether it can make an impartial decision with regard to taking litigation against directors. 
The demand rule is unclear on which corporate body minority shareholders should make the 
demand if both directors and supervisors have breached their duties to the company and/or if 
majority shareholders are involved in the misconduct. It is also unclear whether a demand 
could be made on a shareholder meeting.  
  
Furthermore, the content of the demand is not specified under Art 152. In the United States, 
the demand must be adequate for its purpose and it should at least include “the identity of the 
alleged wrongdoers, the factual basis for the allegation, the harm caused to the corporation, 
and the remedial relief requested”.50  It must also contain information reasonably specific for 
the board of directors to make an informed business judgement as to “whether to invest the 
resources of the corporation in pursuit of the shareholders’ claim”51 or to try and resolve the 
matter internally. It is recommended that detailed requirements of the content of the demand 
should be specified in China. The feasibility of this approach depends to a great extent on the 
shareholders’ ability to access all relevant information.  
 
Finally, although the 30-day limit aims to prevent the board from postponing or ignoring 
shareholders’ demand, it is considered unreasonable in some situations; for example, when 
the board needs more time in some complicated cases to investigate the case and make the 
final decision to go to litigation.  As shareholders can bring a derivative action providing the 
board fails to do so within 30 days, the tight timetable may rush directors into making 
irrational decisions which may not be in the best interests of the company.  Although it is 
difficult to fix a time limit to suit all situations, it is recommended that a court, upon request 
from the board of a company, should extend the time limit when necessary.  
 
The demand rule can therefore be criticised for the lack of requirements on the content of the 
demand. There are also concerns about whether a board can make independent and impartial 
                                                          
50
 Rule.23.1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
51
 Spiegel v Buntrock 571 A 2d 767 at 773 (Del 1990).  
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decisions regarding the shareholders’ demand because it is not required to investigate the 
veracity of the content of the demand nor justify their decisions. In addition, shareholders’ 
lack of access to relevant information and the inflexibility of the time limit are further 
concerns. If the demand rule is expected to play an effective role in deterring malicious suits, 
the above problems need to be addressed adequately in any future company law reform
52
.  
 
In order to provide a timely remedy for shareholders when demand is futile, this demand 
requirement can be exempted in “emergency situations” or “when the damage to the 
company will be irrecoverable if shareholders do not bring proceedings immediately”.53  The 
meaning of the emergency situations, however, is unclear. Meng has suggested that it should 
include the following: there is a danger that the limitation of actions will shortly expire, or 
there is a high risk that some properties will be transferred, or other situations which the 
judges consider as urgent.
 54
  The broader this scope is, the more derivative claims can evade 
the demand requirement. The Supreme People’s Court judge Xiaoming Song has rightly 
propounded that the demand rule should be used as guidance for judges and not as a 
compulsory procedure.
55
  This would appear to be a most sensible way forward which would 
allow the emergency situations to be interpreted on a much broader basis for the protection of 
shareholders’ interests.   
 
Huang’s study shows that the demand was actually made in 17 cases out of the total number 
of 50 cases reported from January 2006 to December 2010. Of the 17 cases, shareholder’s 
demand was rejected in 5 cases and the company did not act within 30 days in the remaining 
12 cases
56
. It appears that as long as a demand is made the claimant shareholder can proceed 
with the derivative claim, regardless of the reasons why the demand was rejected. By contrast, 
a demand was not made in 26 cases over this period, out of which the court dismissed the 
case on the basis of the failure to make a written demand in 6 cases and the court excused the 
demand requirement in 20 cases
57
. 
                                                          
52
 Ma, ‘The Deficiencies of Derivative Actions in China’ (2010) Company Lawyer 150, 154. 
53
 Art 151 (2), CCL 2005.  
54
 Xianggang Meng, “Shareholders’ derivative actions” [Gongsi Gudong Daibiao Susong de Shenli] (2007) 4  
Law Application (Falu Shiyong) 19, p 21.  
55
 Guohui Li, “The Corporate Practice and Trial Experience – An Interview with the Chairman of the Civil 
Tribunal of the SPC regarding the Difficulties in the Application of the New Company Law” [Yanjiu Gongsi 
Fawu, Zhidao Shenpan Shijian]  4 (2007) Law Application (Falu Shiyong), p. 3.  
56
 Huang, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis” (2012) 
27 Banking and Finance Law Review 619, 638. 
57
 Ibid, 639. 
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Furthermore, Lin’s study demonstrates that the demand was not made in 22 cases out of 103 
cases reported from January 2006 to August 2013
58
. This could be attributed to the fact that 
those shareholders may not be familiar with the demand requirement or they may think that it 
was pointless to make a demand on the company which was controlled by the wrongdoers
59
. 
In some cases, however, the court adopted strict approach towards the demand requirement 
and the cases were rejected by the courts on the basis of the failure to comply with the 
demand requirement
60
.  
 
It is argued that the demand rule is a simple procedure which does not set up the necessary 
hurdles to filter malicious suits. It is unclear which criteria the courts will use to accept or 
reject claims because of the lack of guidance in the CCL 2005. It seems that shareholders can 
bring a derivative action when the board refuses to sue or simply wait for 30 days after the 
demand; thus, even if the board decides that litigation is not in the best interests of the 
company, such as when the costs of litigation far exceed the benefits, shareholders can still 
proceed with a derivative action. It is therefore argued that the procedures under the CCL 
2005 are insufficient to function as a deterrent against unmeritorious lawsuits and the courts 
should play a more active role and have more control over derivative actions in China.  
 
4. The litigation costs in China 
 
The costs of litigation in China may deter weak and frivolous claims but at the same time 
they are main obstacles for shareholders considering derivative actions. When deciding 
whether to pursue litigation or not, shareholders inevitably evaluate the costs of litigation and 
any chances of recovery. In particular, shareholders face three main disincentives: firstly, any 
recovery goes directly to the company and the claimants may only benefit indirectly from the 
outcome; secondly, other shareholders who do not join the litigation still benefit as much as 
the claimants, which more often than not leads to the free-riding problems; finally, it is 
unclear whether and in what circumstances the courts will order the company to indemnify 
the claimants’ costs.   
                                                          
58
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59
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The litigation costs in China mainly consist of the court’s fees and the lawyers’ fees.  The 
courts’ fees include the filing fees and other expenses. 61  The former is paid to the courts 
before litigation proceeds whilst the latter, such as the fees for investigation and preservation 
of assets, are incurred during the hearing. The general rules on the allocation of costs in 
China are similar to those in the UK:
 62
  the losing party pays the filing and other statutory 
fees, but not the lawyers’ fees of the prevailing party.63  If the litigation is unsuccessful, the 
claimant shareholders have to pay their own costs of litigation as well as those of the 
defendant.  Even if successful, the claimants still have to pay their own lawyer’s fees.  By 
contrast, the claimants in the UK are in a better position because their lawyer’s fees are paid 
by the respondents.   
 
Moreover, the problems associated with high costs in the UK have been alleviated to a certain 
extent by the costs indemnity order under the Civil Procedure Rules 19.9E. A high standard 
of test of “genuine need” 64 , however, has been established in case law so that a costs 
indemnity order cannot be granted too easily. There is still no clear guidance on the 
circumstances where such an indemnity order should be granted. Keay has convincingly 
argued that the courts tend to be cautious when awarding a costs indemnity order to 
shareholders who successfully obtain permission to continue a derivative action. Over the 
eight-year period since the codification of derivative claims in the UK, the courts only 
granted such orders in 2 out of 8 cases where the shareholder has been successful under the 
statutory regime
65
. 
 
Without any financial compensation as incentive, fewer individual shareholders in China are 
willing to take the risk of initiating such uncertain lawsuits, taking into account of the high 
costs of litigation and the free-riding problems. The rules on costs indemnity cannot be found 
in the Civil Procedure Law 1991. Without such an indemnity order, even if the derivative 
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action is successful, the claimant still has to pay for other reasonable costs such as lawyers’ 
fees. In order to relieve the claimants of some of the financial burdens and uphold 
shareholders’ rights, it was recommended by many academics that a costs indemnity order 
should be introduced into China whereby companies should be responsible for all the 
claimant’s costs if the litigation is initiated in good faith. 
 
The financial hurdles for shareholders have been, to some extent, lowered by the SPC 
Provisions 2017. According to Rule 26, if part or all of the derivative claim has been 
supported by the Court, the company should pay reasonable costs and expenses which 
incurred by the shareholders in bringing such action. Moreover, the SPC Provisions 2017 
introduce specific rules on the outcome of the litigation: any benefit recovered in a derivative 
action should belong to the company if the litigation is successful
66
. The claim would not be 
accepted if shareholders try to hold defendants directly liable for themselves
67
. It aims to 
avoid double recovery from the defendants and draw a clear line between shareholders’ 
personal actions and derivative actions.  
 
Huang has argued that the current rules on derivative actions in China have made a 
“noticeable impact” in terms of the number of cases brought before the court and the benefits 
realized from them
68
. The sheer number of cases (a total of 50 cases from January 2006 to 
December 2010) makes a “stark contrast” with the limited number of derivative suits before 
2006 (a total of 23 cases). The substantial increase in the number of cases indicates that the 
current regime has at least “facilitated” the derivative suits in China69. More recently, Lin’s 
study shows that a total number of 103 derivative actions cases were decided between 
January 2006 and August 2013. Of the 103 cases, the claim was accepted by the court in 47 
cases (less than half of cases), rejected in 55 cases and settled between parties in only one 
case. This demonstrates that the judges are “increasingly willing to accept” derivative 
actions
70
.  
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The introduction of derivative actions in the CCL 2005 represents a significant milestone in 
the protection of shareholders’ interests71. The provisions have been further enhanced and 
clarified by the SPC Provisions 2017. The broad scope and relaxed procedure make 
derivative actions subject to abuse from malicious suits and therefore more judicial control 
should be in place in order to protect the company.  It is therefore necessary to examine the 
possibility of borrowing the ideas from the UK because of its relative sophisticated rules on 
derivative actions and the influence of English law globally
72
.  
5.  The Statutory Derivative Claims in the United Kingdom  
 
Shareholders must follow a two-stage procedure in section 261 of the Companies Act 2006 to 
apply for permission to continue derivative claims
73
. It reflects the Law Commission’s 
proposal that it should be for the courts to determine whether a derivative action should 
proceed.
74
  At the first stage, the claimant is required to establish a prima facie case and the 
court considers only the application and the evidence filed by the claimant. If it does not 
show there is a prima facie case, the court must dismiss the application at this stage and make 
any consequential orders it considers appropriate.
75
 If the court is satisfied at this stage, it 
may give directions for evidence to be filed by the company and may adjourn the proceedings 
to enable that evidence to be obtained.
76
 In this way, the court can dismiss unmeritorious 
cases at an early stage without involving the defendant directors or the company.  
At the second stage but before the substantive action begins, the court may “give permission 
to continue the claim on such terms as it thinks fit or refuse permission and dismiss the 
claim”. 77  It also has the jurisdiction to adjourn the proceedings and give directions, for 
example, to order a general meeting to take place. This is designed to meet the situation 
where the course that should be taken by the court is not yet clear.
78
 The permission will be 
refused if the court is satisfied with one of the following circumstances: firstly, the claimant 
in accordance with the duty under s.172 of the CA 2006, which is to promote the success of 
the company, would not seek to pursue the claim; secondly, if the breach of duty has not 
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occurred, it has been authorised by the company; thirdly, if the misconduct has already 
occurred, it was authorized by the company before it occurred or ratified by the company 
since it occurred.
79
  
In other situations, the court can exercise its discretion to take into account all the relevant 
circumstances in s 263(3), in particular, the claimant’s good faith, the success of the company, 
the possibility of being authorised or ratified, the decision not to sue, alternative personal 
action and the views of members who have no personal interests.
80
 There are some concerns 
over the list of criteria which appears to be a set of hurdles which claimants have to overcome. 
The list was considered “as a signal to adopt an over-restrictive approach and maintain a 
policy of not favouring a derivative action”.81  As Lowry argued, the new procedure involves 
the exercise of judicial discretion and it is unlikely to be more efficient or more cost-
effective.
82
 It is questionable whether the judges’ old restrictive attitudes towards 
shareholders’ derivative actions remains.83 Recent study has shown that restrictive judicial 
approach has been adopted. According to Keay, the permission was only granted in 8 cases 
out of the 22 cases over the eight year period since the derivative claims were codified
84
. 
The success of statutory derivative claims in the UK also depends on whether they are more 
popular than the unfair prejudice remedy. Some academics are sceptical of the success of the 
statutory derivative claims. As Payne has argued, although the new procedure has removed 
the problems associated with the “fraud” and “wrongdoer control”, it seems unlikely to 
increase the use of the derivative actions in the face of the unfair prejudice remedy.
85
 
Sugarman shared similar views by arguing that the unfair prejudice remedy is likely to 
remain the remedy of first choice because of its advantages over derivative claims in terms of 
broad scope of application, simpler procedure and flexible remedies.
86
 The concerns about 
the restrictive judicial attitudes towards such claims are, to some extent, reflected in Mission 
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Capital Plc v Sinclair87 and Franbar Holding Ltd v Patel88. The application for permission 
was rejected for similar reasons in both cases; in particular, it was held that the claimant 
could achieve all that it properly wanted through the unfair prejudice petition or through 
shareholders’ personal actions rather than derivative actions.89  In some cases, however, the 
existence of unfair prejudice remedy is not considered a complete barrier to bringing a 
derivative action. In Kiani v Cooper90, it was held that the availability of an alternative 
remedy under the unfair prejudice grounds did not prevent permission being granted. 
Similarly in Ritchie v Union of Construction, Allied Traders and Technicians91, it was held 
that the alternative remedy was merely an important factor to be taken into account in the 
exercise of a court’s discretion.  
The statutory derivative actions have replaced the complex and obscure rules at common law 
and they have provided some clarity and certainty; however, they have not been frequently 
used in the United Kingdom since they came into force in October 2007. Only 22 derivative 
actions were instituted in the UK between October 2007 and September 2015
92
. The main 
reasons for the few number of cases are well explained by Keay as follows: the judges appear 
to have adopted a “fairly strict approach” to permission application, the unfair prejudice 
remedy is considered substantially more desirable than derivative actions mainly because its 
wide scope of application and personal reliefs. Moreover, the high costs of litigation and the 
uncertainties of the costs indemnity order may deter shareholders from bringing such action; 
shareholders may also lack financial incentive to purse an action which they can only 
indirectly benefit; and finally, shareholders may be dissuaded from taking action because of 
the free-riding problems
93
.  
 
Conclusion   
 
The success of derivative actions in China and the UK not only depends on the effectiveness 
of their own substantive and procedural rules, but also on many other factors such as judicial 
attitudes, the costs of litigation and the availability of alternative remedies. In China, the CCL 
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2005 and the SPC Provisions 2017 have provided consistent legal basis for judges to try these 
cases and derivative actions have been widely used in LLCs since their introduction because 
of their broad scope of application, relaxed procedure and the absence of alternative remedies 
in China. The substantial number of cases indicates that the courts are more willingness to 
allow derivative claims, to redress corporate wrongs and protect the interests of both the 
company and shareholders, at least in LLCs. The scarcity of cases in JSCs; however, raises 
serious concerns about the role of derivative actions in such companies. It is therefore 
recommended that the current shareholding percentage and shareholding period for JSC 
shareholders should be lowered or preferably abolished.   
 
Derivative actions, if used in an inappropriate manner, have the potential to disrupt the 
management of a company. It is essential to strike the proper balance between the protection 
of shareholders’ rights and the protection of a company’s day-to-day management. In light of 
the simple demand rule in China, it is desirable to adopt the English approach whereby the 
courts consider a number of factors such as whether the claimant acts in good faith, whether 
the misconduct has been authorised or ratified; and whether the company has decided not to 
sue. The effectiveness of derivative actions may also depend on whether there is an 
alternative and more popular remedy. If alternative remedies are more effective and easier 
than derivative actions, there may be less demand for the latter; for example, the success of 
statutory derivative actions in the UK is compromised by the popular unfair prejudice 
remedies
94
. In China, shareholders’ personal remedies are limited; for example, appraisal 
remedies do not apply when the majority shareholders have infringed minority’s interests95. 
Moreover, as the unfair prejudice remedies do not exist in China, shareholders have no 
alternative remedies other than derivative actions to redress unfairly prejudicial misconduct 
by majority shareholders or directors. As a consequence, shareholders rely heavily on 
derivative actions to redress corporate wrongs. It is recommended that the unfair prejudice 
remedy should be considered for adoption in China in order to provide a more efficient 
personal remedy for shareholders
96
.  
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Shareholders in both China and the UK may be discouraged from bringing derivative actions 
by the high costs of litigation and the free-riding problems. In particular, shareholders in 
China may be discouraged because of the traditional Chinese culture of avoiding litigation 
and the difficulties of getting access to information
97
. The SPC Provisions 2017 have clarified 
the procedural rules on derivative actions, reduced the costs for bringing such actions and 
clarified the outcomes of a successful claim
98
.  These rules will help to establish a more 
comprehensive and practicable system of derivative actions in China and achieve the ultimate 
aim of protecting the interests of companies and their shareholders.  
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